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Nato a Brescia il 24 Aprile 1965.

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FORMAZIONE E INCARICHI ACCADEMICI

Novembre 1989 Laurea in Discipline Economiche e Sociali Università "Luigi Bocconi", Milano (110 e lode)  
Luglio 1995 Dottorato in Economia, Université catholique de Louvain.  
Luglio 1992 Master in Matematica, Université catholique de Louvain.  
Luglio 1991 Master in Economia (honors), Université catholique de Louvain.  
  
1995 - 1996 Maitre de Conference invité, Université catholique de Louvain.  
1995 - 1998 Ricercatore, Università di Brescia, (presa di servizio 12 Dicembre 1995)  
1998 - 2001 Professore associato, Università di Brescia, (presa di servizio 1 Novembre 1998)  
2001 - 2005 Chercheur qualifié du FNRS, Belgique (presa di servizio 1 Novembre 2005)  
2005 - Professore Ordinario, Università di Brescia, (idoneità di Professore di Prima Fascia 19  
Luglio 2000, presa di servizio 1 Luglio 2005, conferma 1 Luglio 2008)

ALTRI INCARICHI SCIENTIFICI

2000 Coordinatore Nazionale Progetto PRIN "Markets with asymmetric information"  
2008- 2013 Membro del Comitato Editoriale, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*

VISITE ACCADEMICHE (permanenza per più di una settimana)

1994 Tel Aviv University  
1996 Yale University  
1997 Stanford University, Tel Aviv University  
1998 Université de Cergy - Pontoise, CORE  
1999 Université de Cergy - Pontoise, CORE  
2001 Brown University  
2003, 2004 IMF, Washington  
2005 Rice University  
2004 - 2010 Université Paris-Dauphine  
2007 - 2015 CORE, Université catholique de Louvain

## ATTIVITA' DIDATTICA

Economia Politica  
Microeconomia  
Teoria dei Giochi  
Economia Internazionale Avanzata  
General Equilibrium Theory.  
Economics of Imperfect Information.

## ARTICOLI SU RIVISTE SCIENTIFICHE

1. A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information (with F. Forges),  
*Games and Economic Behavior*, 18, 159 - 175, 1997.
2. Self-fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations (with F. Forges),  
*Journal of Economic Theory*, 75, 338 - 406, 1997.
3. Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games (with F. Forges),  
*Games and Economic Behavior*, 25, 292 - 310, 1998.
4. Consumer theory and Axiomatics: a note on an early contribution by Luigi Amoroso  
(with A. Guccione),  
*History of Political Economy*, 31, 587 - 589, 1999.
5. Nash - Walras Equilibria of a Large Economy (with H. Polemarchakis),  
*Proceedings of The National Academy of Sciences*, 97, 5675 - 5678, 2000.
6. Rules transparency and political accountability (with M. Bordignon),  
*Journal of Public Economics*, 80, 73 - 98, 2001.
7. A note on the incentive compatible core (with F. Forges),  
*Journal of Economic Theory*, 98, 179 - 188, 2001.
8. Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies (with F.  
Forges and A. Heifetz),  
*Economic Theory*, 18, 349-365, 2001.
9. Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: a survey (with F. Forges and R. Vohra),  
*Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 38, 1-41, 2002
10. Informational Smallness and Rational Expectations (with A. Heifetz),  
*Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 38, 197 - 218, 2002.
11. Information at Equilibrium (with H. Polemarchakis),  
*Economic Theory*, 21, 573 - 584, 2003.
12. Ferrara's cost of reproduction doctrine (with A. Guccione and M. Guidi),  
*Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, 26, 107 - 114, 2004.
13. Two-person bargaining with Verifiable Information (with G. de Clippel),  
*Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 40, 799 - 813, 2004.

14. Two remarks on the Inner Core (with G. de Clippel),  
*Games and Economic Behavior*, 50, 143 – 154, 2005.
15. Production and Financial Policy under Asymmetric Information (with J. Drèze and M. Tirelli),  
*Economic Theory*, 35, 217–231, 2007.
16. Credit Market Failures and Policies (with S. Modica),  
*Journal of Public Economic Theory*, 11, 363 – 382, 2009.
17. An Economic Theorists' Reading of Simone Weil (with A. Heifetz)  
*Economics and Philosophy*, 24, 191 – 204, 2008.
18. Afriat's Theorem for General Budget Sets (with F. Forges)  
*Journal of Economic Theory*, 144, 135 – 145, 2009.
19. Markets and Contracts (with A. Bisin, J. Geanakoplos, P. Gottardi and H. Polemarchakis),  
*Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 47, 279-288, 2011.
20. Competitive Equilibria with Private Information on Both Sides (with M.Meier and H.  
Polemarchakis),  
*Economic Theory*, 55, 257-289, 2014.
21. Aspiration Traps (with Aviad Heifetz),  
*Berkeley Electronic Journal of Theoretical Economics*, 15, 125-142, 2015.
22. Overlapping Consensus Thin and Thick: John Rawls and Simone Weil (with A.Heifetz)  
*Philosophical Investigations*, 39, 362–384, 2016.

#### CAPITOLI DI LIBRO

23. Knowledge at equilibrium (with H.Polemarchakis),  
in Y. Shoam (ed) *Rationality and Knowledge*, Morgan-Kaufman, New-York, 211-228, 1996.
24. Three Books on Knowledge and Rationality,  
*Research in Economics*, 51, 69 - 82, 1997.
25. Trade and Welfare (with T. Cordella and H. Polemarchakis),  
in G. Chicchilnisky (ed) *Markets, Information and Uncertainty*, CUP, Cambridge, 322- 327, 1999.
26. Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian Games (with F. Forges) in d'Aspremont (ed) *Social Organization and Mechanism Design*, De Boek, Bruxelles, 1999.
27. Efficienza delle regole e responsabilizzazione dei politici (con M.Bordignon), in Dardanoni e Sobbrío (eds) *Istituzioni Politiche e Finanza Pubblica*, Milano, 1999.

#### WORKING PAPERS

1. Information at a Competitive Equilibrium (with H. Polemarchakis)  
CORE DP 9583, 1995.

2. Arbitrage and equilibrium with exchangeable risks (with A. Heifetz and H. Polemarchakis), CORE DP 9946, 1999.
3. Shareholder-efficient production plans in a multiperiod economy (with J. Dreze and O. Lachiri) CORE DP 2007/82, 2007.
4. A Large market game with private information on both sides (with M. Meier).
5. Stock prices, anticipations and investment in general equilibrium (with J. Dreze and O. Lachiri) CORE DP 2009/83, 2009. Revise and resubmit, *Economic Theory*
6. Merit and Rent in a Growing Economy